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CHANTAL THOMAS*
Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt: A Case Study of
the Economic Family in Global Contextt
This Essay links a particular legal case study with a broader set
of questions about the "family" in a global political and economic con-
text. Part I clarifies the analytic links between the household, the
market, and globalization. By studying Egypt, the Essay focuses on
one part of this global sociolegal continuum and draws out the special
significance of transnational background rules and conditions for the
"developmental state." Part II presents the legal framework affecting
labor conditions of sub-Saharan African asylum-seekers who are mi-
grant domestic workers in Egypt, and particularly the legal
framework that affects their ability to bargain in securing livelihood
strategies. Domestic and international law fail to provide adequate as-
sistance and support for these efforts, but they inevitably construct the
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environments for them: "foreground" rules of employment and con-
tract law (but not family law) affect the bargaining environment for
migrant domestic workers; "background" rules, most importantly
those related to sovereignty and immigration, also crucially influence
the bargaining environment. Part III returns to the conceptual land-
scape, connecting this study with current quandaries in global
governance studies and critical understandings of the "economic
family."
INTRODUCTION
Although the domestic worker is part of the "economic family,"
supplying necessary labor to the household, the paradigm of family
law does not govern the terms and conditions of domestic work. Fam-
ily law concerns itself primarily with marital and parental
relationships; as a consequence, it tends to conceptualize women in
households as wives and mothers. For the same reason, issues of
waged work and employment arise in family law primarily as they
affect marital and parental relationships (e.g., through the valua-
tions relevant to divorce proceedings). The "household" and the
"family" are contiguous domains of unwaged work, largely distinct
from the waged-labor marketplace.
Domestic workers destabilize such demarcations of the house-
hold and the market. Without legally recognized familial ties to the
households they work for, domestic workers instead relate to these
households as employees or independent contractors. Predominantly
women,1 they provide waged care work supporting households in
which they are neither wives nor mothers, for employers who are fre-
quently the household wives and mothers. Market conditions often,
though not always, disfavor domestic workers against their
employers. 2
My goal in this Essay is to link a particular legal case study of
domestic workers with a global political and economic context. This
Essay examines the legal framework affecting the labor environment
for African, and particularly Sudanese, asylum-seekers who work as
household help in Cairo, Egypt.3 A "developmental state" such as
1. International Labour Organization [ILO], Int'l Lab. Conf., 99th Session, June
2-18, 2010, Decent Work for Domestic Workers, at 6, Report IV(1) ("women invariably
make up the overwhelming majority of domestic workers") [hereinafter 2010 ILO
Report].
2. See infra Part I.A., I.B., and II.C.
3. See infra Part II.A. and II.B. Egypt, an African country that is also often con-
sidered to be part of the Middle East, draws asylum seekers from both regions.
Though many asylum seekers in Egypt also come from other countries in the Arab
world, those from Sudan, the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia) and sub-
Saharan Africa (most proximately Chad, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, but also including nationals of western and southern African countries) are far
[Vol. 58
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Egypt represents an important part of the global sociolegal contin-
uum for labor migration and ultimately for migrant domestic
workers. One of the aspirations of this paper is to demonstrate that
the phenomenon of irregular migration to a developing country such
as Egypt is intimately interconnected with broader effects of moder-
nity and globalization. This focus resists the conventional notion of
the modern household as economically residual. The household is an
economically significant site, linked to patterns of globalization.
4
The overwhelming livelihood strategy of these asylum seekers
situates them as "irregular" (undocumented) migrant domestic work-
ers. In understanding how law affects these livelihood strategies, this
Essay does not look to family law as traditionally defined but rather
to the laws which shape the work environment: first, to legal excep-
tionalism in "foreground" rules of employment and contract affecting
domestic workers, and, second, to "background" rules and conditions
governing migration and development that that link national econo-
mies through global dynamics and that contribute to sociolegal
environments of "informality" and "irregularity" for domestic work-
ers. These legal rules and institutions governing employment and
immigration are not the domain of family law, conventionally under-
stood. Nevertheless, they importantly shape the conditions in which
family law relationships arise.
Methodologically, this exposition combines core insights of legal
realism-from Hale 5 to Hohfeld 6 -with tools from governance stud-
ies in economics, critical theory and political science that look not
only to formal laws stemming from state actors, but also to other po-
tentially regulatory actors and forces: less explicit state practices of
implementation and administration, non-state actors (international
and non-governmental organizations), ideologies and informal norms,
and economic relationships. 7 Proper analysis of the laws must in-
more visible and much less well assimilated. United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees [UNHCR], 2005 STAT. Y.B. 319 (showing that recognized refugees from the
Occupied Palestinian Territories far outnumber recognized refugees from the Sudan
or any other African country. More recently, huge waves of Iraqis have fled to Egypt
and elsewhere). See UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT OF IRAQI REFUGEES (2007).
4. See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 753 (2010), for an exposition on the relationship of this pro-
position to world-systems theory.
5. See, e.g., infra text and note 20.
6. See, e.g., infra text and note 124.
7. In the study of governance we see a convergence of analytical methods from
different parts of the academy: economists such as Douglass North have offered insti-
tutional analysis which includes both formal rules and informal norms and ideologies,
as well as methods of implementation and enforcement (or lack thereof) by the state
and the impact of economic and social forces, see, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITU-
TIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). Critical theorists
such as Michel Foucault have adopted studies of governmentality which pay close
attention both to administrative practices of the state and to forms of knowledge that
shape power relations within state and social structures, see, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT,
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clude their application through formal channels of doctrinal
interpretation and implementation within the relevant institution
(the state or the international organization in this context), the back-
ground social context, and the economic environment. This
interdisciplinary method more accurately measures legal and institu-
tional effect.
I. GENERAL CAUSES OF LEGAL INFORMALITY AFFECTING MIGRANT
DOMESTIC WORKERS
Informality is legally produced through multiple layers of per-
mission, omission, and prohibition. The informal labor environment
for migrant domestic workers is importantly constructed by law in
both its explicit content and in its application. In order to lay the
groundwork for Part II's close study of the legal framework for asy-
lum-seekers as migrant domestic workers in Egypt, this section sets
out three general sources of legal informality for migrant domestic
workers that arise at different levels: legal exceptionalism for domes-
tic work; irregularity in migration; and the economics of the
developmental state.
A. Informality from Legal Exceptionalism for Domestic Work
According to comparative studies of national legal systems, ex-
ceptional legal status for domestic workers manifests itself in a range
of ways.8 Egypt is one of many legal systems that contain outright
exclusions of domestic workers from labor codes and other regula-
tions. 9  This characteristic exclusion from legal regulation'
SURVEILLIR ET PUNIR (1975). Both approaches influence the analysis here. Addition-
ally, the study of "global governance" by political scientists in international relations
has offered the key precept that regulatory effects stem from both state and non-state
actors. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D.
Donahue eds., 2000),
8. Extensive comparative analyses of national legal systems have been con-
ducted by the ILO. See, e.g., Jos6 M. Ramirez-Machado, Domestic Work, Conditions of
Work and Employment: A Legal Perspective, ILO Conditions of Work and Employ-
ment Series No. 7 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 ILO Report]; 2010 ILO Report, supra note
1. Such comparison, needless to say, requires multiple disclaimers, as it is challenged
not only by differences in legal contexts but also by the fact that labor protections can
arise from multiple formal and institutional sources within any given country.
9. 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8, at 7 ("Quite frequently, labour laws refer to
domestic workers either to exclude them completely from their scope or to grant them
lower levels of protection by being deprived on many of the rights accorded to other
categories of workers."). This arrangement characterizes between twenty and twenty-
five percent of studied countries. Compare 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8, at 9 (find-
ing that nine of sixty-four countries explicitly excluded domestic workers from labor
laws), with 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, Appendix (listing about twenty-five per-
cent out of a total of seventy-two countries with explicit exclusions).
10. In a second group of legal systems, domestic workers are not explicitly ex-
cluded, but are not explicitly mentioned either, creating questions about the
applicability of the general laws. Compare 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8, at 8 (find-
ing that seventeen of sixty-four countries "have set no specific regulations on domestic
[Vol. 58990
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work in their basic labour legislation"), with 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1 (finding
about half of seventy-two countries do not specifically address domestic workers).
Whereas the 2003 ILO report draws no conclusions about the applicability of labor
laws to domestic workers in such cases, the 2010 report reflects efforts by the ILO to
take a broad perspective, stating that "this report.., has, along with the [ILO's Com-
mittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations] the ILO's
Legal Adviser, made the assumption that unless domestic workers are explicitly ex-
cluded from the scope of labour legislation they are included." 2010 ILO Report, supra
note 1, at 26, para. 88. The third group of legal systems, in which domestic workers
are explicitly addressed, establishes separate standards for domestic workers, either
in discrete sections of the general labor code or in entirely different regulations. Com-
pare 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8 (finding thirty-eight of sixty-four countries' labor
laws addressed domestic workers in separate regulations), with 2010 ILO Report,
supra note 1 (finding about twenty-five percent of countries explicitly addressed do-
mestic workers in separate regulations). Such provisions nevertheless typically create
less than complete parity with other types of work. See, e.g., 2010 ILO Report, supra
note 1, at 49, Figure IV.1 ("As can be seen from figure IVA, there are significant
differences between generally applicable working time standards and those that con-
cern domestic workers. Globally, domestic workers are usually subject to less
protective limits than those applied to the general workforce. Half of the countries
surveyed permit the domestic labour force to work longer hours than other workers,
while just over forty-five percent of countries impose the same limit for all workers; a
small percentage have a lower limit or no limit at all for domestic workers.").
Successful mobilization by labor, human rights, and other social movements have
brought about some new initiatives to include or expand provisions on domestic work.
See 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 23-24 (describing initiatives in Spain, Uru-
guay, South Africa, and India). "Despite this, and despite its nominal inclusion in
legislation, paid domestic work remains virtually invisible as a form of employment in
many countries." 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 12, para. 44. In the United States,
for example, both federal and state labor laws reflect the exceptional, and often ex-
cluded, status of domestic workers. Federal labor statutes amended a previous
exclusion for some domestic workers from minimum wage and maximum hours re-
strictions in 1974, but still exclude "companions" for the sick or elderly. 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(15) (2006). Federal statutory protections for the right to organize explicitly
exclude all domestic workers. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
Occupational health and safety standards do not exclude domestic workers at the
statutory level, but that exclusion was nevertheless adopted at the administrative
agency level "as a matter of policy." 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2006). Federal antidiscrimina-
tion provisions, though they contain no explicit exclusion of domestic workers, operate
to exclude them in practice since they apply only to workplaces of fifteen or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). State laws in the United States are, of course,
more various, but reflect similar patchworks of exclusion and differential treatment.
As one example, in the state of New York, the minimum wage and hours laws apply to
all workers (though not explicitly mentioning domestic workers). New York Minimum
Wage Act, N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 650-665 (Consol. 2010). Most other New York state labor
laws either explicitly exclude domestic work, New York State Labor Relations Act,
N.Y. Lab. Law § 701(3)(a) (Consol. 2010), fail to explicitly include it among a list of
other specified occupations, N.Y. Lab. Law § 161 (Consol. 2010) (establishing one day
of rest for a series of employees of owners of "dwellings" and other residences, but
making no reference in the series to domestic workers), or include it but provide a
lesser level of regulation. As in federal law, New York state labor law excludes live-in
domestic workers from standard overtime rules, though unlike federal law New York
does guarantee a lower level of overtime for them. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit.12, § 142-2.2 (2010). Legislation has recently been proposed to amend this excep-
tionalism, and in the process has touched on central questions relating to the
propriety of and justifications for it. See, e.g., Mona Simpson, Pay Your Nanny on the
Books, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2010), at A21 (describing the bill, passed by the New York
state legislature and pending signature and approval by New York's governor, which
would bring domestic workers into line with standard protections on overtime, sick
leave, and vacation). In conclusion, though the U.S. system of federalism creates a
2010]
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contributes to an economic environment of pronounced informality, in
which market transactions are not actively monitored or regulated by
the government and without clearly defined contracts or
protections.11
The movement of the domestic worker out of the realm of the
household represents one aspect of the broader move from "status to
contract,"12 against a backdrop in which industrialization shifted the
bulk of production from "traditional" household-centered agrarianism
to "modern" production occurring in firms. 13 Yet that legal transfor-
mation has been far from complete.
A number of policy justifications exist for the lack of domestic
work regulation. They include challenges to administrability posed
by the small scale of domestic work and the "specificity"1 4 of domestic
work conditions. The personal or intimate nature of the relationship
between domestic workers and the families for which they work also
heavily informs resistance to regulation.' 5 As the saying goes, domes-
tic workers are "just like one of the family,"1 6 triggering conceptual
resistance to formal legal intervention in the family private sphere.
Next to such ostensibly more neutral reasons, however, lie conscious
or unconscious legacies of slavery and servitude.' 7
B. Informality from Irregular Migration
Domestic work is also increasingly characterized by the "preva-
lence of migrant work."18
more convoluted regulatory structure, in essential aspects it mirrors the pattern of
legal exceptionalism discussed in the text.
11. For extensive discussion of the concept of economic informality, see generally
LINKING THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL ECONOMY: CONCEPTS AND POLICIES (Basudeb
Guha-Khasnobis et al. eds., 2006).
12. HARRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 100 (1861) ("we may say that the move-
ment of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract"); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT ch. 4 (1975). In eighteenth century legal treatises, the household included
not only marital (husband-wife) and parental (parent-child) relations, but also those
of "master and servant." See JANET HALLEY, FAMILY LAw IN AMERICA: A GENEALOGY 4
(2009). In the nineteenth century, the household servant became a paid wage laborer
and that legal relationship became defined by contract.
13. See HALLEY, supra note 12.
14. 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8, at 8; 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 24. See
infra Part II.B.4.(discussing ILO justifications for not including domestic work in in-
ternational labor standards).
15. See Mundlak & Shamir, supra note *.
16. See BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
DOMESTIC LABOUR ch. 9 (2000).
17. See id., at 126; DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: How GLOBALIZATION CREATES
MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS (2008); see also infra Part III.B.
18. 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 21 ("One of the most striking changes in
domestic work in the past 30 years has been the growing prevalence of migrant
work.").
[Vol. 58992
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Though most migrants are authorized to enter their countries of
destination, migrants also enter without proper documentary status.
In traditional conceptions-and under current legal frameworks-
undocumented migrants have been divided into distinct categories.
"Forced" migration refers to those who arrive in a foreign country
without proper documentation because they have been compelled by
political persecution, and who now seek asylum. If successful, these
asylum seekers will be recognized as refugees and will be resettled.
By contrast, labor migration refers to those who leave home for
"merely" economic reasons. In application, however, it is hard to keep
these categories distinct. Migration experts are increasingly chal-
lenging this dichotomy as it applies to undocumented migrants.
These experts argue instead for a single term of "irregular" migra-
tion, which would group both categories together or at least place
them on a continuum with each other.19
Forced and labor migration have interconnected causes in the
country of origin. Rather than distinct phenomena, political persecu-
tion and economic desperation may be co-effects of the same
problematic environment in which political and economic instability
and inequality feed into each other. Though rooted in legal tradition,
the view that economic circumstances are not coercive is a particular
and limited one.20
The interconnection between "forced" and "economic" migration
also characterizes the experiences of migrants in the host country.
The relative ease of access to asylum procedures stems from the con-
ception of undocumented migration as a crime, 21 which may
therefore be more easily excused than justified. Refugee status,
though difficult to obtain, may be easier to claim than regular work
authorization. 22 In addition, once in the new country, both political
19. Philippe Fargues, Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular
Immigration South and East of the Mediterranean, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic
Notes 2009/02, Irregular Migration Series, Background Paper ("[Tihese ... categories
are not as distinct as one might think in terms of migration motives."). Fargues adds
the third category of "transit" migrants, or those seeking to migrate elsewhere either
through the refugee resettlement process or for work. This category is quite important
in Egypt, as will be discussed below, but not necessary for the introductory discussion
in this section.
20. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
21. See Fargues, supra note 19.
22. International Organization for Migration [IOM], World Migration Report
2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy 206 (2008) [herein-
after 2008 IOM Report] (describing the "so-called 'nexus' between asylum and
migration: the propensity of significant numbers of irregular migrants to make use of
asylum procedures not because of a genuine need for protection, but to gain entry to
new countries and access to their labor markets. This pattern is particularly evident
when asylum systems are perceived as the primary or only official mechanism sanc-
tioning the entry and stay of foreigners in the absence of an alternative means of
access to the labor market."); Guy Mundlak, Irregular Migration in Israel-A Legal
Perspective, at 1, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2008/59, Irregular Migration
20101
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asylum seekers and migrant workers find themselves faced with the
same challenges and survival options. 23 Their experiences and liveli-
hood strategies at that point can become indistinguishable.
The difficulty in access for economic or labor migration contrib-
utes to "the development of informal labor markets,"24 since "the
informal economy is the natural point of insertion into the labor force
for migrants who cannot find regular employment because of their
lack of appropriate documentation." 25 Informality and irregularity
tend to occur in low-skilled and less profitable sectors. 26 For a variety
of reasons, migrants, and particularly migrant women, often end up
in domestic work. Domestic work lacks licensing and membership re-
quirements that form barriers to entry in other, more highly
remunerative occupations that are therefore harder for foreign na-
tionals to join. As one of the least well-paid and least secure types of
jobs, it is also the most susceptible to newly arrived and poor
workers.
Thus, economic informality both attracts, and is increased by,
the presence of irregular migrants. Domestic work, as a major part of
the informal economy, thus becomes a major draw for migrant wo-
men with "irregular" status seeking livelihoods. 27
C. Informality in the Developmental State
Though the most visible debates about immigration seem to fo-
cus on influxes from South to North, in fact most migrants "move
from one developing country to another rather than from a develop-
ing country to a developed one."28 If unchecked immigration is
viewed as a challenge to sovereignty or statehood, the challenge
seems more acute precisely in the postcolonial global South in which
sovereignty is comparatively recent and sometimes still contested.
Geographical proximity is of course one reason for the dispropor-
tionate migration between developing countries. These countries
tend to be easier points of entry for other reasons as well, either in-
tentionally for reasons of political solidarity or due to a lack of
administrative and policing border control capacity. Both reasons ap-
Series, Legal Module, at 2 ("Some [migrants] attempt the asylum avenue given the
tight control over labor migration.").
23. Fargues, supra note 19, at 1 (these groups "tend to merge into one category in
the local reality.., where [they] have no legal access to labor, welfare and protection,
and, at best, subsist.").
24. 2008 IOM Report, supra note 22, at 43-44.
25. Id. at 207.
26. Id. at 206.
27. Id. at 82 ("Female labor migration is characterized in particular by its concen-
tration in a very limited number of female-dominated (essentially lower-skilled)
occupations associated with traditional gender role, such as domestic .... "); id. at
Text Box 3.2.
28. Id. at 32. See infra Part III.A. for further reflections on migration.
[Vol. 58994
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ply to Egypt: the Egyptian constitution welcomes political asylum-
seekers, and until recently Egypt's southern borders remained rela-
tively porous. 29
Economic informality also exerts a particular pull in "the devel-
opmental state."30 The International Labor Organization reports that
in developing countries generally between one-half and three-
quarters of non-agricultural jobs are informal. Moreover, though once
viewed as a vestige of "traditional" economic production that would
subside with economic modernization, it is now apparent that eco-
nomic informality is "actually expanding" in developing countries. 3 1
Thus, the issue of economic informality has become the issue of eco-
nomic "informalization," denoting a process that is dynamically
increasing in significance. 32
This process of economic informalization reflects a number of fac-
tors in developing countries: the deregulatory trend in the global
economy generally in the past quarter-century; 33 the adoption of ne-
oliberal economic policies under debt arrangements, established by
international financial institutions;34 and the decay of bureaucratic
infrastructure. As a consequence, in many developing countries that
once sought to maintain state-managed industrialization, employ-
ment in the formal and public sectors (often highly correlative) has
now greatly declined. 3 5
29. See infra note 40 for a detailed discussion of factors contributing to migration
from sub-Saharan Africa to Egypt.
30. For a discussion of "the developmental state," see David M. Trubek, Develop-
mental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of
Development and Law, Remarks at the Conference on Social Science in the Age of
Globalization National Institute for Advanced Study on Social Science, Fudan Univer-
sity, Shanghai (Dec. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1349163. There is an emerging body of scholarship on law and develop-
ment. See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
31. Martha Alter Chen, Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the For-
mal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment, in LINKING THE FORMAL AND
INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 75, 81.
32. James Heintz & Robert Pollin, Informalization, Economic Growth and the
Challenge of Creating Viable Labor Standards in Developing Countries 1 (Political
Economy Research Institute [PERI], Working Paper No. 60, 2003) ("Over recent de-
cades, conditions for working people in developing countries have undergone a major
transformation. This has been the substantial rise in the proportion of people engaged
in what is termed 'informal' employment, generating a broad trend toward 'informal-
ization' of labor market conditions in developing countries. Current estimates suggest
that informal employment comprises about one-half to three-quarters of non-agricul-
tural employment in developing countries. Moreover, and perhaps even more
significantly, these proportions appear to be rising even when economic growth is pro-
ceeding in developing countries, contrary to what a previous generation of researchers
and policymakers had anticipated.").
33. Keith Hart, Bureaucratic Form and the Informal Economy, in LINKING THE
FORMAL AND INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 21, 23, 27.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Dzodzi Tsikata, Towards a Gender Equitable Decent Work Regime for Infor-
mal Employment in Ghana: Some Preliminary Considerations, CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.
20101 995
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At a policy level, informalization is viewed approvingly in some
sectors as a necessary adjustment to overly rigid and statist economic
strategies. 36 In the area of labor law, the deregulatory argument is
phrased in terms of the need for labor flexibilization. 37 Amongst crit-
ics of deregulation, however, the growth of "flexibilization" as a
strategy for labor law reform has raised widespread concerns about
its contribution to "precarious work": "The decline of the standard
employment relationship and the increase in precarious work-work
that is insecure, badly remunerated, unprotected, and largely beyond
the control of employees-is one of the most worrying problems of the
new economy."38 Flexibilization is of concern everywhere, but in the
developmental context it has the distinctive feature of having been
part of a coherent reform agenda proposed by the international finan-
cial institutions. 39
Of what significance is economic informalization and labor mar-
ket flexibilization to the issue of domestic work, for which such
characteristics are neither new nor exceptional? These dynamics
form an important component of the background conditions within
which domestic labor markets work. They shape not only bargaining
(forthcoming); Marilyn Carr & Martha Alter Chen, Globalization and the Informal
Economy: How Global Trade and Investment Impact on the Working Poor 2 (Women
in Informal Employment Globalizing & Organizing [WIEGO], Working Paper No. 1,
2002) ("the informal economy [has] continued to expand and grow").
36. Martha Alter Chen provides a comprehensive analysis of the literature:
Over the years, the debates on the informal economy crystallized into three
dominant schools of thought: dualism, structuralism and legalism. The dual-
ists argue that informal... activities have few (if any) linkages to the formal
economy... and that informal workers comprise the less-advantaged sector
of the informal market. Unlike the dualists, structuralists see the informal
and formal economies as intrinsically linked ... capitalist firms ... are seen
to reduce their . . . labor costs, by promoting informal production .. .both
informal enterprises and informal wage workers are subordinated to the in-
terests of capitalist development ... The legalists focus on the relationship
between informal entrepreneurs/enterprises and the formal regulatory envi-
ronment, not formal firms.
Chen, supra note 31, at 84; see also Carr & Chen, supra note 35, at 6 ("what distin-
guishes each of these schools is their underlying model of power or power
relationships. The dualists subscribe to the notion that there are few (if any) power
relationships between.., the informal and formal economies. The structuralists sub-
scribe to the notion that the formal economy exerts a dominant power relationship
over the informal economy in its own interests. The legalists subscribe to the notion
that informal entrepreneurs exercise their own power.").
37. Dzodzi Tsikata criticizes this literature, arguing that, in terms of labor issues,
there has not been a focus on development or sustainability, or livelihood security. See
Tsikata, supra note 35, at 5 ("Dominated by the international financial institutions
... and economists, policy discussions have stressed the importance of flexibility of
labor markets for economic growth." ); see also Anne Trebilcock, Using Development
Approaches to Address the Challenge of the Informal Economy for Labor Law, in
BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOR LAw 63 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds.,
2006).
38. Rittich, supra note *, at 31.
39. Id. at 35.
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amongst particular contracting parties but also the possible direc-
tions of change in a broader context. Against a backdrop of increasing
informality, the likelihood of domestic workers to be able to demand
better terms and conditions, either individually or collectively, is
greatly challenged. Moreover, the decline of formal, public sector op-
portunities in developing countries is affected by these trends. With
economic informality more prevalent, livelihood alternatives may
decrease.
II. SPECIFIC CAUSES OF LEGAL INFORMALITY AFFECTING AFRICAN
ASYLUM SEEKERS AS MIGRANT DOMESTIC
WORKERS IN EGYPT
Egypt is a major destination for asylum-seekers. 40 In the migra-
tion lexicon, Egypt is a country of transit, meaning this destination is
40. The significant population of African asylum-seekers in Egypt can be attrib-
uted to a variety of interlocking factors. First, waves of intense political and military
conquest and upheaval, as well as economic desperation, have expelled African asy-
lum seekers from their countries of origin. Donald P. Chimanikire, African Migration:
Causes, Consequences and Future Prospects and Policy Options (paper presented to
the U.N. Univ. Conf., "Poverty, International Migration, and Asylum," Helsinki, Fin-
land, Sept. 27-28, 2002). In addition to these "push" factors, are diverse "pull" factors
attracting African asylum seekers to Egypt. Most African migrants enter Egypt from
its southern border with Sudan. Munzoul A.M. Assal, Refugees from and to Sudan
(paper prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and
North Africa, The Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program, American Univer-
sity in Cairo, Egypt, Oct. 23-25, 2007). Until recently, see infra text accompanying
notes 96-99, the Egypt-Sudan border has not been heavily policed, certainly in com-
parison to the borders of proximate wealthier nations, i.e., Israel and Mediterranean
Europe. Second, there are relative economic and political advantages of migration to
Egypt. With its capital city Cairo as the largest on the African continent, Egypt at
least promises economic and survival opportunities. As a territory that is relatively
free of outright physical conflict-despite or because of its authoritarianism-Egypt
offers a degree of stability and physical security. Cairo's history of relative cosmopoli-
tanism must also factor in, as a city with ancient traditions of political, mercantile
and cultural flux, and hybridity. Third, Egypt's legal culture has also been relatively
hospitable. Following World War II, Egypt pursued aspirations of postcolonial leader-
ship in the international community and the Third World. Accordingly, the Egyptian
constitution grants political asylum to all who have defended "their people, human
rights or justice." CONST. OF THE ARAB REP. OF EGYPT art. 53 ("The right to political
asylum shall be guaranteed... for every foreigner persecuted for defending the peo-
ples' interests, human rights, peace or justice.").
This general posture of openness is particularly enhanced in the case of the Suda-
nese, since, as the Egyptian government recently put it, "the Sudanese in Egypt have
always enjoyed a special status." U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Written Replies by the Government of Egypt
Concerning the List of Issues Received by the Committee on Migrant Workers Relating
to the Consideration of the Initial Public Report by Egypt, 6, U.N. Doc. CMW/C/EGY/
Q/I/Add.1 (Feb. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Migrant Workers' Committee]. This charitably
phrased description glosses over the colonial relationship of Egypt (as a proxy for
Britain) over Sudan and the prejudices of many Egyptians against the Sudanese.
Nevertheless, it does reflect geographical, historical, cultural, and linguistic ties that
have resulted in various treaties granting mutual rights of, inter alia, entry and work,
though the most recent of these treaties has not been fully implemented. YASMINE
AHMED & REBECCA DIBB, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AMONG SUDANESE MIGRANTS IN
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nominally only temporary for most asylum seekers, though in reality
asylum-seekers are in Egypt indefinitely, as they await the refugee
status determination process. 4 1 Asylum seekers gather in Egypt to
seek recognition under international refugee law and subsequently
resettlement to wealthier countries in the global North and the Mid-
dle East.4 2 The fact that many migrants in Egypt are attempting to
resettle elsewhere adds to the context of precariousness. Despite the
many forces of attraction bringing asylum seekers to Egypt, they face
serious challenges to their everyday survival. Domestic work forms a
significant source of livelihood for them. As a consequence, asylum
seekers are also migrant workers, demonstrating the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing "political" from "economic" migrants.4 3  Without
documentation in either category, they are also irregular migrants.
A. Foreground Rules: Labor and Employment Law in Egypt
Notwithstanding the regional and local particularities of Egyp-
tian family law-an essential exposition of which can be found in
Lama Abu-Odeh's Modernizing Muslim Family Law44-Egypt resem-
bles the universalized model described elsewhere in this volume: it
identifies much of what we understand as family law as a separate
domain which does not include waged work.4 5 The informal and un-
GREATER CAIRO 14 (Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University
in Cairo, 2008) ("[The 1976 Wadi El-Nil (Nile Valley) [agreement] granted [mutual
rights] ... to enter and exit.., without visa requirements and unrestricted access to
education, employment, health-care and ownership of property .... This agreement
was revoked in 1995 after an assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak blamed Suda-
nese Islamist extremists in Ethiopia. The sudden change in the law caused a number
of Sudanese migrants, previously residing lawfully in Egypt, to find themselves... in
an irregular situation .... However, in 2004, Egypt signed the Four Freedoms Agree-
ment... [which] promised a partial return to the Wadi-El Nil Agreement...."). For
criticisms of Egypt's lack of implementation of the Four Freedoms Agreement, see
infra Part II.B.3. . The result of all of these factors is that the Sudanese are the larg-
est group of foreign nationals living in Egypt, though the lack of data leaves a very
wide estimated range of between two and five million. Migrant Workers' Committee,
supra.
41. See infra text accompanying note 67.
42. Mundlak, supra note 22, at 6 (noting that irregular migrants that Israel
deems "[ilndividuals from enemy countries generally enter [by] crossing the border
with Egypt.").
43. Assal, supra note 40, at 6 (it is "difficult to procure neat boundaries between
voluntary and forced migration. Whereas conventional wisdom in migration studies
looks at refugees and migrants as having different motives for leaving a homeland
(migrants for economic reasons, refugees for political reasons), recent studies show
that a mixture of factors produces both categories.").
44. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043 (2004).
45. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 4; Duncan Kennedy, Savigny's Family/Patri-
mony Distinction and its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2010).
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regulated labor environment for domestic workers is constructed by
law, most importantly through regulatory exclusion.46
Household labor, in the Middle East and North Africa, as else-
where, provides a major source of livelihood for migrant workers. 47
Egypt stands in contrast to other countries in the region, however, in
its relatively low level of formally employed migrant domestic work-
ers. Whereas in other states in the region, migrant workers are
predominantly South Asians who have procured formal entry
through the kafala system,4s in Egypt (where the majority of domes-
tic workers are Egyptian) migrant domestic workers are
predominantly "irregular" migrants from the Sudan and the horn of
Africa.49 Due to the country's relative poverty, large population, and
unemployment, such formal contracting for migrant household help
is negligible. This contrast is reflected also in the national origins of
the domestic migrant worker population to be found in Egypt, which
are predominantly sub-Saharan African as opposed to the South
Asians who supply the households of the Levant and the Gulf.
The origin of much of the migrant domestic worker population as
asylum-seekers and other irregular migrants, rather than in a formal
contracting system, alters the dynamics between employer and em-
ployee. Though employees can be vulnerable in both circumstances,
widespread abuses arising in the kafala context-restrictions on free-
dom of movement and withholding of identity and travel
documents-do not tend to pertain to the Egyptian context where
many migrant workers are unlikely to have valid travel documents in
the first place. Rather, the vulnerability of migrant domestic workers
comes from the factors that contribute to their irregularity-the lack
of formal opportunities to enter the country, and the exclusion of do-
mestic work from labor law.
46. See Ray Jureidini, Irregular Workers in Egypt: Migrant and Refugee Domestic
Workers, 11 INT'L J. MULTICULTURAL Soc'Ys 75-82 (2009).
47. The Middle East and North Africa have the "highest share of migrant popula-
tions in the world, if regular and irregular migration is included as well as refugees
and asylum seekers." Jureidini, supra note 46, at 77. Migrants have historically con-
stituted an important source of labor for the oil-producing Gulf states, Libya, Jordan
and, increasingly in recent years, Israel. Philippe Fargues, Introduction to EUR. UNIV.
INST., ROBERT SCHUMAN CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD., MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION 2006-
2007 REPORT (Philippe Fargues ed., 2007); ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ARAB STATES,
GENDER AND MIGRATION IN ARAB STATES: THE CASE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS 11 (Simel
Esim & Monica Smith eds., 2004); see Mundlak, supra note 22. The migrant popula-
tion is greatly increased beyond "regular" migrants by substantial movements of
refugees: "the Middle East is the world's largest source and host of refugees, constitut-
ing around 42 per cent of the total world refugee population." Jureidini, supra note 46,
at 77.
48. Elsewhere in the region, particularly the oil-producing Gulf states, Libya, and
Jordan, the "kafala" system predominates whereby migrant workers enter into con-
tracts prior to their entry into the country to work as household help. ILO REGIONAL
OFFICE FOR ARAB STATES, supra note 47, at 44.
49. Jureidini, supra note 46, at 78.
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Egyptian labor law (of which the most recent iteration is the La-
bour Law of 2003), provides: "Domestic work is an exception to labor
law."50 Reflecting the exceptionalism discussed in Part I above, the
law is perhaps especially notable for also explicitly incorporating the
justification for exceptionalism that draws on the context of intimacy
in the household, as the law goes on to state: "This is because of the
strong relations that grow between the servant and the employer
which enables the former to know many secrets and personal issues
of the employer."51
In addition to establishing this exception from the labor law code,
the statute also explicitly overrides the general employment-security
default rules in Egypt by stating that otherwise applicable "restric-
tions on terminating the work contract do not apply to the employer
in this case."52
Unlike other states in the region, in Egypt no specific legislation
has been adopted to promote or facilitate the process of hiring and
entry for migrant domestic workers-a fact which stems from the
vast differences in underlying economic conditions between Egypt, a
poor, labor-rich, densely populated country, and other countries in
the region that are wealthier and suffer from shortages of national
labor supply.
To the contrary, over time and particularly with the economic
decline of the 1980s and early 1990s, the government has adopted a
strict stance discouraging regular migration for domestic workers. 53
The Ministry of Labour and Immigration issued a decree in 1984
"specifically prohibiting foreign maids from entering Egypt."54 In
1987 the Ministry of Internal Affairs "launched a campaign to arrest
those without proper work visas."55
In 2003, migrant domestic workers were included in a broader
tightening of Egyptian work visa rules requiring that foreign workers
obtain a work permit before entering the country. In 2006, foreign
domestic workers were specifically the focus of a further tightening of
controls on entry, in a decree prohibiting the request of work permits
50. Labor Law, Law no. 12 of 2003, art. 4(G); Jureidini, supra note 46, at 79.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The strict stance constitutes a change in enforcement rather than underlying
law. The legislation itself has been in place since Nasser's regime, under which Law
No. 91 was passed prohibiting the issuance of work permits to foreigners for positions
that Egyptians could be hired to fill. In practice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was
lenient in enforcing this law, and many foreigners, among them migrant domestic
workers, were allowed entry notwithstanding the general prohibition. Others in-
tending to work entered on tourist visas, a practice that remains common in Egypt
today.
54. Jureidini, supra note 46, at 80.
55. Id.
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for foreign nationals to perform household labor ("house manager or a
similar position such as nanny, cook, maid").56
The context of these restrictions appears to have been a straight-
forward series of efforts to shore up employment opportunities for
Egyptian nationals. 57 Apparently to enable Egypt to remain compli-
ant with its obligations under international refugee law, an exception
to this strict prohibition allows a work permit to be obtained through
special petition in cases of "humanitarian and social" necessity.5 8 As
the next section indicates, however, in practice this permission has
not materialized, so that obtaining formal work permits remains
practically impossible regardless of refugee or asylum-seeker status.
B. Background Rules: Migration and the Right to Work in Egypt
for Asylum-Seekers
If foreground rules on labor and employment codes and regula-
tions in Egypt provide virtually no protection for domestic workers;
their relative bargaining power is affected by background rules relat-
ing to their status in the country. With the right to work legally in
the country, migrant domestic workers would occupy a stronger posi-
tion since they need not fear and cannot be threatened with arrest
and deportation.
Egypt has entered into a significant number of treaties that do,
by virtue of their subject matter, potentially apply to migrant domes-
tic workers. That these treaties have been ratified, and that they are
directly enforceable, makes them an important part of the legal
framework. However, as the close readings below reveal, that frame-
work often ends up mirroring, in form or in effect, the regulatory
exclusion in the Egyptian labor code. As such, it reinforces the dy-
namic of informality that pervasively defines these workers'
experiences.
56. Id. at 82.
57. At the same time, the Egyptian government was acceding to greater trade
liberalization on traditional goods through the World Trade Organization. The coinci-
dence of these work restrictions with WTO accession may either have been evidence of
the lack of coherence in domestic economic regulation, or evidence of a strategy to
provide some economic security in a context where foreign import competition might
otherwise be undermining employment opportunities.
58. Id. at 82:
In 2006 the Egyptian Government placed strict control on the formal entry of
foreign domestic workers. Decision (700), article (11) states: It is prohibited
to request a work permit for foreigners for the occupations of house manager
or a similar position such as nanny, cook, maid, etc. of any nationality. It can
only be obtained in writing from the central administration of labour from
the ministry and in cases where humanitarian and social circumstances ne-
cessitates and after consulting with the minister.
According to Egyptian law, therefore, once a treaty is ratified and published, no addi-
tional step of implementing legislation is required for it to take domestic legal effect.
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The right to work for African asylum-seekers in Egypt who are
migrant domestic workers is potentially offered by international law
through a series of treaties on the treatment of refugees, the human
rights of migrant workers and their families, international labor
standards, and transnational criminal law. Each of the respective
conventions is part of a broader treaty regime offered by, respec-
tively, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Human
Rights Committee, the International Labor Organization, and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
With the exception of some ILO conventions, all of the treaties
are directly enforceable as a matter of Egyptian law. 59 This direct
legal effect stands in contrast with non-self-executing jurisdictions
where implementing legislation is required for treaties to become do-
mestically applicable. In Egypt, once ratified treaties have been
officially published by the Egyptian government, "[tiheir provisions
are equivalent to those of applicable Egyptian law and may be in-
voked before all legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the
State."60
Of course, the formal enforceability of treaties in Egypt does not
guarantee their automatic application. There is a complex negotia-
tion between the Egyptian judicial and executive branches vis-A-vis
various aspects of the nation's laws. Courts have applied interna-
tional human rights treaties provisions directly, sometimes
politically challenging the executive branch. 61 At the same time, the
59. These treaties are held by the Egyptian Constitution to possess "the force of
law." CONST. OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 151, available at: http://www.el-
shoura.gov.eg/shouraen/constpdfleng-const.PDF. The direct legal effect of ratified
and published treaties has been confirmed in Egyptian jurisprudence. See General
Prosecution case 4190 (Supreme State Security Court, 1986) (cited in TAREK BADAWY,
COMMENTS ON EGYPT'S REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS
OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES 3 (2007). It has also been
confirmed by the Egyptian executive branch in its reporting to the United Nations, for
example on its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers
and Their Families discussed below. See U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties under Article 73 of the Convention, Initial Report of States parties
due in 2004: Egypt, U.N. Doc. CMW/C/EGY/1 (Aug. 21, 2006), paras. 12 & 13:
[I]nternational treaties in general are governed by the provisions of article
151 of the Permanent Constitution of 1971, which provides that following
completion of the requisite constitutional procedures, treaties are deemed to
constitute part of Egyptian law. Accordingly, following their ratification and
publication, international instruments concerned with human rights and
freedoms, including the International Convention on the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families, are regarded as being
equivalent to laws enacted by the legislative authority. Their provisions are
equivalent to those of applicable Egyptian law and may be invoked before all
legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the State.
60. Id.
61. Awad el-Morr, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt and the Protection
of Human and Political Rights, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW 229 (Chibli Mallat ed.,
1993).
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executive branch has advanced a variety of strategic moves designed
to minimize the role of the judiciary and of constitutional protections,
for example by amending the constitution to reduce the judiciary's
power 62 (through approval in a national legislature which, as a par-
liamentary system, includes a majority of legislators who belong to
the same political party as President Mubarak). Though the constitu-
tional provision establishing the force of law of treaties has not (yet)
been amended, other constitutional amendments have necessarily
changed the overall balance of power between various branches of
government and the environment in the judicial system.
As in many legal systems, the enjoyment of any particular right
in Egypt is therefore dependent on an array of institutional, political,
and societal factors. This balance of power requires a more nuanced
portrayal of Egypt than as either a police state in which individual
constitutional and human rights have no real impact, or as an ideal
system in which all such rights are given full legal effect.
Beyond this general limitation on the effect of treaties in Egypt,
there are particular types of limitations that may further hamper the
effect of special frameworks set forth by particular instruments.
These limitations, de jure and de facto, have the overall result of les-
sening labor protections that would extend to the migrant domestic
workers in this study. Both types of limitations will be discussed
below.
1. International Refugee Law in Egypt
International refugee law provides refugees in Egypt the same
right to work as the country accords to other foreign nationals. 63
However, a number of obstacles stand in the way of full enjoyment of
this right. First, the Egyptian government has been reluctant to rec-
ognize fully the right to work of refugees in its territory. Identity
documents issued to refugees explicitly prohibited working, appar-
ently in violation of Egypt's international law obligations, until
62. NATHAN J. BROWN, MICHELE DUNNE, & AMR HAMZAWY, EGYPT'S CONTROVER-
SIA.L CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2007).
63. Egypt has a reservation to the Refugee Convention's requirement that recog-
nized refugees enjoy equality with Egyptian nationals insofar as national labor
legislation and social security provisions are concerned. See Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees art. 24(1), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. However, Egypt
has made no similar reservation to the Convention's requirement that recognized ref-
ugees benefit from the rules awarded other foreign nationals regarding the right to
work. Id. art. 17(1) ("The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying
in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign
country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning
employment."). That means refugees should be able to obtain a work permit if they go
through the appropriate channels, as has been argued by the refugee advocate com-
munity in Egypt. Interview with Michael Kagan, Senior International Human Rights
Fellow, American University in Cairo (Feb. 4, 2009).
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recently when that practice finally ended under pressure from the
refugee advocacy community. 64 Second, even with the path eased
somewhat by the change in identity documents, other serious social
and economic barriers stand in the way of the exercise of the right to
work by lawful refugees. 65 The process of obtaining work permits for
foreign nationals that refugees would have to undergo is very time-
consuming, so that even in highly-paid and otherwise formal eco-
nomic sectors, it is not uncommon for employees to be working
without formal permits. In other words, labor informality pervades
even traditionally formal sectors of the Egyptian economy.
Third, the right to work enjoyed by recognized refugees suffers
from the limitation that recognized refugees form only a small subset
of the population of asylum-seekers in Egypt. For example, though
the total number of Sudanese nationals in Egypt is estimated at be-
tween two and five million, only about thirteen thousand are
officially recognized as refugees. 66 The process of refugee status de-
termination in Egypt has been criticized for both its delays6 7 and its
improper tendency to under-recognize refugee status claims. As an
example of both problems, in 2004 the UN High Commissioner on
Refugees (UNHCR) suspended all refugee status investigations for
64. As indicated supra, this prohibition appeared to have violated Egypt's obliga-
tions under Article 17 of the Refugee Convention. As an apparent compromise in the
face of the violation charge by refugee advocates, refugees' identity documents now
are completely silent as to work permission. Theoretically, therefore, refugees should
now be able to apply for and obtain work permits using the same channels as other
lawfully present foreign nationals in Egypt.
65. Neither the UNHCR nor the NGO community that supports asylum seekers
in Cairo has devoted more than minimal attention to the issue of work permit, given
the many pressing claims on resources and the need for attention to ensuring physical
security and providing advocacy in the status determination process. Interview with
Shahid Haque, Regional Representative for the Middle East, International Organiza-
tion for Migration, in Cairo, Egypt (Feb. 12, 2009); Interview with Mario Tavolaj,
Special Envoy, International Organization for Migration, in Khartoum, Sudan (Feb.
17, 2009); Interview with Intake Staff, All Saints Cathedral, in Cairo, Egypt (Feb. 13,
2009). These offices focus mainly on assisting in refugee resettlement and return, as
well as providing basic support services. Some NGOs do provide assistance to asylum
seekers in gaining employment, and in particular in placing them in household em-
ployment. However, the lack of legal clarity surrounding the right to work, coupled
with the precarious positions of both asylum seekers and NGOs in Egypt, mean that
any employment advocacy provided regarding terms and conditions of work tends to
be highly informal. Interview with All Saints Cathedral, supra.
66. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS (EIPR) & INTERNATIONAL FEDERA-
TION FOR HurMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), EGYPT: PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT
WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES, NGO ALTERNATIVE REPORT TO THE UN
COMMITTEE ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND MEM-
BERS OF THEIR FAMILIES 9 (2007) [hereinafter EIPR & FIDH]. Though this
discrepancy reflects in part the many Sudanese nationals in Egypt who are not asy-
lum seekers, the proportion of recognized refugees to asylum-seekers is estimated to
be well under one to ten.
67. TAREK BADAWY, COMMENTS ON EGYPT's REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR
FAMILES 5 (2007).
[Vol. 581004
MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN EGYPT
Sudanese asylum-seekers, following a ceasefire agreement in the
north Sudan-south Sudan civil war, on the grounds that political con-
flict technically no longer existed in Sudan. The idea that political
upheaval had suddenly vanished, and that Sudanese asylum-seekers
were fully safe in returning home, was questioned by many. Dismay
and outrage against the UNHCR's suspension of refugee claims even-
tually led Sudanese asylum-seekers in late 2005 to stage protests, sit-
ins, and other civil disobedience in the Cairene suburb where the
UNHCR office was located. This civil disobedience was abruptly and
brutally halted by the Egyptian police in an action that resulted in
the deaths of twenty-eight protesters. 68
The limitations of the refugee status determination process re-
flect in part the dearth of administrative capacity in the wake of large
demand from asylum-seeking communities. 69 Yet, as the 2005 inci-
dent demonstrates, the problems with the refugee status
determination process also result from a political context in which
the Egyptian government feels little accountability to the asylum
seeker communities, and in which the UNHCR is constrained by its
status both as a guest of the Egyptian government and a servant of
the international community of states. Moreover, wealthy countries
who would ostensibly provide resettlement for refugees have their
own reasons for resisting the refugee recognition and resettlement
process.
2. International Law on Migrant Workers in Egypt
The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their
Families (the Migrant Workers' Convention) excludes refugees, 70
reinforcing the dichotomy between "forced" migration for political
reasons and "voluntary" migration for economic reasons, and secur-
ing a division of labor between the international law applying to
these two categories. While conceptually questionable, the scope of
the Migrant Workers' Convention does provide a source of protection
under international law for the migrant workers in Egypt who are
68. Assal, supra note 40, at 7 n.2 ("The brutal onslaught by Egyptian police forces
on Sudanesse refugees in Cairo sheds light on a horrendous human tragedy. Over five
thousand policemen armed with sticks and shields broke up the small square where
the Sudanese refugees had been camping at around 5:00 am Friday, December 30,
2005. Twenty-eight Sudanese refugees were killed while many others injured.").
69. Low institutional capacity characterize both the Egyptian governmental of-
fices responsible for the process, and the Egyptian offices of the UNHCR, which
conducts the bulk of the process on behalf of the government. Michael Kagan, Seeking
Asylum in the Middle East: State-to-UN Responsibility Shift and the Challenge of
Finding a Foundation for Refugee Policy in a Troubled Region (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (presented at American University in Cairo, Department of
Law Faculty Workshop, Feb. 21, 2008).
70. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families art. 3, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93
[hereinafter Migrant Workers' Convention].
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asylum-seekers but who have not received formal recognition as law-
ful refugees-in other words, for the remainder of "irregular"
migrants. 71
The Migrant Workers' Convention is arguably a "significant
rights document for legal migrant workers," 72 requiring states par-
ties to afford them, for example, treatment equal to nationals in
health and social services.73 A trickier question is what protection the
Convention provides for irregular migrant workers. In the perennial
tension between human rights and sovereignty, where does the Con-
vention stand-does it reinforce sovereignty by circumscribing
human rights claims only to those workers whose presence has been
authorized by the state, or does it dare to cross the final frontier of
sovereignty by insisting that even workers whose presence is unau-
thorized enjoy some rights by virtue of their humanity?
The Convention does contain a broadly stated principle of non-
discrimination that could be read expansively to include irregular
migrants.7 4 However, this language does not explicitly include docu-
mentary status. Given the importance of documentary status in
migration law, doctrine, and practice, this absence suggests an inten-
tional omission. That documentary status is excluded as a basis for
protection under these broad introductory nondiscriminatory provi-
sions is further supported by considering it in the context of the
entire document, which contains sub-sections explicitly accorded to
"all" migrant workers regardless of documentary status (Part III),
and to only documented workers (Part IV). 75 Even if the more
expansive interpretation were to be adopted, the extension of nondis-
crimination to migrant workers regardless of documentary status
would apply to only those substantive rights provided in Part III on
the "Human Rights of All Migrant Workers," since the other two
71. See supra Part I.B. (defining irregular migration).
72. CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 26 (2008).
73. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 70, art. 43.
74. Article 1 establishes an apparently broad scope, applying to "all migrant
workers ... without distinction" and specifying applicability to "all migrant workers
and members of their families without distinction of any kind such as sex, race, color,
language, religion or conviction, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, nationality, age, economic position, property, marital status, birth or other sta-
tus." Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 70, art. 1. Similarly, Article 7 in Part
II of the Convention sets forth a basic nondiscrimination norm, providing that:
States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments
concerning human rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers
and members of their families within their territory ... the rights provided
for in the present Convention without distinction of any kind such as to sex,
race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political or other opinion, na-
tional, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic position, property,
marital status, birth or other status."
75. DAUVERGNE, supra note 72, at 22-25.
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Parts76 are limited explicitly to workers with "regular or docu-
mented" status.
Nevertheless, because Part III "reiterat[es] commitments set out
in other, generally applicable, human rights documents,"77 such as
the right to life,78 freedom from torture 79 and enslavement,80 free-
dom of expression,8 1 and due process protections against arbitrary
detention, trial, and expulsion,82 it could be read as strengthening
the position of irregular migrant workers under international law by
extending some important general human rights to them, or at least
clarifying that these rights apply to them.83
Yet close legal analysis of Part III suggests that it may be clarify-
ing the rights of irregular migrants in the direction of reduced rather
than expanded protection. An examination of the human rights to
freedom of expression, association, and assembly provides an instruc-
tive example. Whereas expression, association, and assembly relate
to each other practically and conceptually, they are often separately
specified under international law and therefore denote distinct
rights.84 The Migrant Workers' Convention references freedom of ex-
pression and only a limited right to join and take part in, but not
form, associations in its provisions applying to "all" migrant workers.
Given the importance of the freedoms of association and assembly for
workers, including migrant domestic workers, this omission could be
read as intentionally allowing for lesser protection of those freedoms
as exercised by undocumented migrant workers. This lesser level of
protection is further clarified by contrasting Part III, applying to ir-
regular migrant workers, with Part IV which does explicitly provide
the right to form associations to workers with regular documentary
status. 85
76. See Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 70, Part IV (addressing those
who "are documented or in a regular situation"), Part V (limiting the rights estab-
lished under Part IV for regular workers in "particular categories" of work).
77. DAUVERGNE, supra note 72, at 25.
78. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 70, art. 9.
79. Id. art. 10.
80. Id. art. 11.
81. Id. art. 13.
82. Id. arts. 14-23.
83. DAUVERGNE, supra note 72, at 25.
84. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) contains the right to freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly,
and the right to freedom of association. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights [ICCPRI, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976); see
also id. art. 19 (freedom of expression); art. 21 (peaceful assembly); art. 22 (freedom of
association). The ICCPR also includes a nondiscrimination provision that is similar to
that of the Migrant Workers' Convention, including the incorporation of the catchall
"other status" term. Id. art. 2(1).
85. Compare Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 70, art. 40 (providing that
the freedom of association can only be restricted by concerns related to national secur-
ity and public order) with id., art. 26.
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While this omission can be viewed as an effort to respect the sov-
ereignty of states parties, and more broadly to recognize the
importance of the rule of law, it may nevertheless contribute to the
deepening of a worker underclass without rights of resistance to em-
ployer abuse. The effects of denying full freedoms of assembly and
association to undocumented workers may paradoxically be to in-
crease lawlessness and insecurity by allowing employers to
destabilize workplace protections, as dissenting U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Breyer stated in a controversial decision reversing existing
federal case law on the applicability of labor rights and remedies to
undocumented workers in the United States.8 6
A recent addition to international and Egyptian law, the Migrant
Workers' Convention entered into force in 2003 and was ratified by
Egypt in 2003. Notwithstanding its entry into force, states parties to
the treaty reflect an imbalance between poor, "sending" countries and
rich, "receiving" countries (none of whom are states parties) and the
greater incentive of poorer countries to establish protections for mi-
grants who are primarily their nationals.8 7
Egypt, like many developing countries, both sends and receives
migrants.88 Thus, although Egypt's incentive in joining the Migrant
Workers' Convention may have been to accord benefits to its nation-
als working abroad, its significant migrant population also creates
potential obligations.
The ineffectiveness of criminal process rights was recently ex-
amined by the UN body monitoring the Migrant Workers' Convention
in the context of Egypt's regular reporting on implementation.8 9
Among other things, Egypt's report included an exposition of the
ways in which national law reflects the Convention's protections for
86. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535
U.S. 137 (2002); id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) ("denial
[of labor law remedies] lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation
(provided ... that the victims are illegal aliens)").
87. The states party "are comprised entirely of countries who primarily send
rather than receive migrants .... All the states party are in the lowest two-thirds of
countries according to... GDP per capita." DAUVERGNE, supra note 72, at 23.
88. With its large population and high unemployment, it unsurprisingly exports
large numbers of workers, primarily to the Arab world but also to the global North.
However, due to its relative economic and political strength vis-b-vis many of its
neighbors as discussed above, Egypt also is a significant receiving country.
89. U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article
73 of the Convention, Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2004: Egypt, U.N. Doc.
CMW/C/EGY/1 (Aug. 21 2006).
1008 [Vol. 58
MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN EGYPT
all migrant workers against discrimination 9 0  and arbitrary
detention.9 1
As a recent commentary on Egypt's Report on the Migrant Work-
ers' Convention observes, however, "Egypt has been under a state of
emergency for more than a quarter of a century, which grants the
police the right to ask any individual for identification at any time."9 2
Despite the Egyptian government's suggestion to the contrary before
the UN Migrant Workers' Committee,9 3 the authoritarianism of the
Egyptian government was closely associated with arbitrary deten-
tions, torture, and harassment by the police in accompanying
submissions by Egyptian NGOs 94 and in other human rights
documentation. 95
Moreover, though deportations have been historically rare,9 6
they have recently increased partially under pressure from neighbor-
ing industrialized countries, Southern Europe and Israel, who are
trying to decrease migration of African asylum seekers moving into
90. Id. at 31, para. 65 (citing a constitutional case which establishd that "every
individual, whether citizen or alien, has ready access to [Egypt's] courts of law and
enjoys protection of the rights laid down in [Egyptian] legislation" for the (subtly
framed) proposition that "an alien, regardless of the legal basis of his presence in the
country, enjoys all aspects of the protection available under the law." (emphasis
added).
91. Id. at 45, para. 124 ("All persons held in detention, regardless of whether they
are Egyptian citizens or aliens, enjoy the same safeguards available under the law,
without distinction or discrimination."). Again, this statement is subtly worded,
avoiding the question of whether aliens have lesser rights regarding the initial pro-
cess of detention and focusing only on rights enjoyed by persons once "held in
detention."
92. BADAWY, supra note 67, at 4.
93. Migrant Workers' Committee, supra note 40, at 3 ("The Egyptian Emer-
gency Act No. 162 of 1958 is in conformity with article 4 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the international rules and norms for dealing
with exceptional situations which endanger society. In accordance... , the declara-
tion of the state of emergency in the country does not give rise to the suspension of the
Egyptian Constitution or of the State's domestic institutions. By law, the legislature
... must approve a declaration, and any extension, of a state of emergency."). This
statement does not discuss what happens once the legislature does approve a state of
emergency, which approval has been granted by the Egyptian legislature.
94. See BADAWY, supra note 67; EIPR & FIDH, supra note 66, at 8 (relating arbi-
trary and racially motivated detentions, as well as "torture and ill-treatment... in all
places of detention in all parts of the country").
95. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Committee against Torture: Egypt, 5(b), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/29/4 (Dec. 23,
2002) (detailing "the many consistent reports received concerning the ... phenome-
non of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement officials, and the
absence of measures to ensure effective protection and prompt and impartial investi-
gations. Many of these reports relate to numerous cases of deaths in custody."); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Egypt, 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY (Nov. 28, 2002) ("The Committee notes with
concern the persistence of torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment at the
hands of law-enforcement personnel, in particular the security services, whose re-
course to such practices appears to display a systematic pattern.").
96. BADAwY, supra note 67, at 5 (generally, "the Egyptian government rarely de-
ports asylum-seekers or refugees").
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their own territories. 97 Such pressure has resulted in extremely dan-
gerous tactics: according to a recent Human Rights Watch report,
Egyptian border forces killed at least thirty-three African migrants
trying to cross into Israel between July 2007 and October 2008.98
Amnesty International lawyers have mobilized legal defense efforts
against deportations of asylum-seekers, of whom Eritreans fleeing a
brutal crackdown in their own country most recently form a signifi-
cant share.99
Despite these terrible circumstances, the very fact that they have
been vocally reported by Egyptian NGOs provides a basis for hope in
the form of increased awareness and political mobilization. In addi-
tion to the precarious status of NGOs in Egypt,100 however, any such
optimism would need to be qualified by the subsequent decline in ad-
vocacy on migrant worker issues. As one NGO executive explained,
this withdrawal came with the realization that the UN reporting pro-
cess exercised little effective constraint, together with a general
context of lack of resources and security. 10 1
3. Sudanese Migrants and the Four Freedoms Agreement
Signed in 2004, the Four Freedoms Agreement is supposed to
give citizens of Egypt and Sudan equal rights with regards to entry,
residence, employment, and movement between the two countries. As
a matter of principle, this agreement should provide Sudanese mi-
grant workers in Egypt with full equality under the law.
97. Rebecca Collard, Run for the Border, EGYPT TODAY, Jan. 2009. An extreme
version of this dynamic occurred in neighboring Libya in 2007, when, after Libya had
"successively opened [its] borders and territory to Arabs in the name of Pan-Arabism,
then to Africans in the name of Pan-Africanism," it suddenly imposed restrictions on
these groups "in repudiation of agreements passed in the framework of the Commu-
nity of Sahel-Saharan States and the Arab Maghreb Union-to please Europe at a
time when the country had become a major gateway for irregular migrants from Af-
rica." Fargues, supra note 19, at 2.
98. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SINAI PERILS: RISKS TO MIGRANTS, REFUGEES,
AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL 34 (2008).
99. Interview with Mohamed Lotfy, Campaigner, Middle East and North Africa
Programme, Amnesty International (Feb. 8, 2009).
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EGYPT: MARGINS OF REPRESSION-STATE LIMITS ON
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ACTIVISM (July 2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/egypt0705/index.htm.
101. Interview with Hossam Bhagat, Executive Director, Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights (Feb. 4, 2009). Bhagat explained that, in his opinion, Egypt "under-
stands very well" that it can indefinitely prolong investigations and findings under
the UN reporting process, by simply issuing denials in response to repeated UN fol-
low-up queries, such as those contained in U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Written Replies by the Govern-
ment of Egypt Concerning the List of Issues Received by the Committee on Migrant
Workers Relating to the Consideration of the Initial Public Report by Egypt, U.N. Doc.
CMW/C/EGY/Q/1/Add.1 (Feb. 6, 2007).
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The implementation of the agreement has been extremely
slow. 10 2 The agreement does not specify which documents are neces-
sary to enjoy these rights and may not apply to Sudanese who do not
have national identity documents. Asylum-seekers who left Sudan
under conditions of extreme haste would be particularly unlikely to
possess such documents, and those fearing political persecution by
their government would probably not be able to obtain such docu-
ments from their government's consulate officers in Egypt.
Moreover, "[i]n practice, the Sudanese are still required to have a
visa to enter Egypt."1 0 3 If there is any clear implication of the Agree-
ment, it is not the expansion of protections for migrant workers, but
rather the reduction of protection for Sudanese refugees whose for-
mal recognition of refugee status in Egypt has been extinguished by
virtue of the Agreement, according to the Egyptian government. 104 In
other words, this "special treatment" seems to have placed Sudanese
residents in legal limbo, not having obtained the formal rights prom-
ised by the Egypt-Sudan treaty and with even less chance of
protection under other treaties in force in Egypt.
4. The International Labor Organization in Egypt
The extension of the freedoms of association and assembly to un-
documented migrant workers also appears to be granted under
international labor law as established and interpreted by the Inter-
national Labor Organization.1 0 5
More specifically in relation to domestic workers, while a minor-
ity of ILO Conventions explicitly allow for the exclusion of domestic
workers,10 6the majority simply do not mention them.107 In the latter
category is the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers. Within the ILO,
102. See, e.g., Gamal Nkrumah, Four Rights Go Wrong?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Sept.
8, 2004.
103. BADAWY, supra note 67, at 9.
104. Migrant Workers' Committee, supra note 40.
105. Freedom of association is protected by the ILO's Convention on the Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ILO Convention No. 87), which
on its own terms applies "without distinction whatsoever," as well as the Convention
on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (ILO Convention No. 98). Addi-
tionally, the freedom of association is recognized as one of the four "core" rights of
international labor law by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Princi-
ples at Work, and held by the ILO to be applicable to all of its members regardless of
whether they have specifically ratified the relevant conventions. The specific issue of
the undocumented migrant came before the ILO Committee when U.S. and Mexican
labor unions filed a complaint alleging that a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision vio-
lated U.S. obligations under international labor law. For a more thorough discussion
of this case, see Chantal Thomas, Convergences and Divergencies in International Le-
gal Norms on Migrant Labor, CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. (forthcoming, 2011).
106. 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 22 (listing ten ILO Conventions that allow
exclusions for domestic workers).
107. Adelle Blackett, Making Domestic Work Visible: The Case for Specific Regula-
tion (ILO Labor Law and Labor Relations Programme, Working Paper No. 2, 1998).
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the "specificity"'0 8 of domestic work has been the primary justifica-
tion articulated for resistance to the active inclusion of it in generally
applicable international labor standards. This reflects a more general
dynamic in which the monitoring bodies of the ILO have been able to
add to formal treaty obligations. 10 9 When combined with the practi-
cal barriers to enforcement, this omission has the effect of rendering
domestic workers "fundamentally invisible."1 0
Notwithstanding the absence of domestic work in the explicit
provisions of ILO Conventions, the monitoring bodies of the ILO have
gradually worked to establish an expansive interpretative stance
that would include domestic workers in the scope of a Convention un-
less explicitly excluded.11' Thus, for example, the ILO's Committee of
Exports on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(CEACR) has found that ILO standards against forced labor 1 2 and
for freedom of association" 3 apply to migrant domestic workers.
Although Egypt is a member of the ILO, it has not signed on to
the ILO Migrant Workers' Convention. However, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, the fact that the ILO Convention on migrant workers is
not ratified by Egypt is not, in the ILO legal context, a persuasive
justification for failing to extend labor standards to migrant domestic
workers. In this context, a prevalent aspect of the ILO's institutional
identity is the monitoring of "compliance with unratified treaties and
other nonbinding norms and standards.""l 4
108. 2003 ILO Report, supra note 8, at 8; 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 24.
109. 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 17.
110. Blackett, supra note 107.
111. Laurence R. Helfer, Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO
Experience, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 195 (2008). Helfer explains how the ILO
has gradually accumulated this authority, which is distinctive for its defiance of both
principal-agent theory and the international law doctrine of sovereign consent. See id.
at 196-97. Heifer "challenges the view that the ILO's . . .[monitoring] authority is
inconsequential," articulating a variety of consequences that flow from monitoring,
including promoting informal enforcement by other states and domestic advocacy.
112. 2010 ILO Report, supra note 1, at 18-19.
113. Freedom of association is protected by the ILO's Convention on the Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (ILO Convention No.87), which
on its own terms applies "without distinction whatsoever," as well as the Convention
on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (ILO Convention No. 98). Addi-
tionally, the freedom of association is recognized as one of the four "core" rights of
international labor law by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Princi-
ples at Work, and held by the ILO to be applicable to all of its members regardless of
whether they have specifically ratified the relevant conventions. The specific issue of
the undocumented migrant came before the ILO Committee when U.S. and Mexican
labor unions filed a complaint alleging that a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision vio-
lated U.S. obligations under international labor law. ILO Comm. on the Freedom of
Ass'n, Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), 605, Report No. 332, Case
No. 2227, Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Series B, No. 3 (Oct. 18, 2002).
114. Helfer, supra note 111, at 195.
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Nevertheless, such formal logic does inform the ILO Sub-Re-
gional Office in Egypt which has stated that, because Egypt is not a
signatory to the ILO Convention on migrant workers, the ILO has no
authority to investigate or advise on the status of migrant work-
ers. 115 In reality, the fact that the ILO Sub-Regional Office has
minimal staff and resources has probably contributed to its reluc-
tance to extend attention to migrant domestic workers. Rather, the
office has focused on advising and supporting tripartite discussions
between the Egyptian government, employers, and trade unions.
More recently, it has incorporated a focus on antitrafficking and has
joined a national consortium on the issue led by the first lady of
Egypt, Suzanne Mubarak, and including the Egypt offices of the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Organization on Migra-
tion, and other bodies.
5. The International Law Against Trafficking and Migrant-
Smuggling in Egypt
As indicated in the preceding section, the Egyptian environment
has featured a growing awareness of and policy focus on antitraffick-
ing efforts. Egypt is a signatory to both the UN Trafficking Protocol
and the UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol.
The problem of trafficking is clearly significant amongst migrant
domestic workers. "Domestic workers, predominantly women, are...
at particular risk of forced labour because of their isolated circum-
stances within private homes, and also because in many cases they
are not protected by national labor law .... [m]igrant domestic work-
ers can be most vulnerable." 1 6
The juridical and conceptual line between trafficking victims and
smuggled migrants reproduces the dichotomy between involuntary
and voluntary migration that distinguishes refugees from migrant
workers. This dichotomy, as discussed above, too simplistically char-
acterizes scenarios that often combine both elements. The blurriness
of the line between trafficking victims and smuggled migrants has,
similarly, been noted as a challenge for coherent and just application
of these treaties.
Even the greater protections under the Trafficking Protocol for
migrants offer very little in the way of concrete help. Rather, these
provisions for assistance and respect for human rights are aspira-
tional and hortatory. If anything, the Trafficking Protocol seems
instead to bolster the authority of the state. This effect comes from
both the Protocol itself, which contains strong border control mea-
115. Interview with Alia Jamal, Senior International Labor Standard Specialist,
International Labor Organization Sub-Regional Office for North Africa (Feb. 3, 2009).
116. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE COST OF COERCION 29, para. 139
(2009).
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sures,117 and from various initiatives to achieve its implementation,
such as U.S. State Department policies that reward other govern-
ments for boosting anti-trafficking enforcement. 118
Particularly given the scant concrete protections for victims,
such dynamics seem likely to increase authoritarianism in many in-
stances. Although the Protocol has not yet been widely implemented
in Egypt, its visible embrace by national agencies in a governance
context of regular allegations of arbitrary detentions and torture
raises this concern.
C. Bargaining under Conditions of Informality
U.S. legal scholars of both the household and the market have
studied economic informality of various types, each with the question
of how these two "private" zones interact with the prospect of public
regulation. With respect to the household, Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser introduced the phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the
law" to describe divorce proceedings in the context of private negotia-
tion and public dispute resolution.119 With respect to the market, law
and economics scholars have frequently studied "private ordering"1 20
and its possible efficiencies and inefficiencies as against the "central-
ized" intervention of the state.' 2 ' In keeping with the liminal legal
category of domestic workers described above, this essential analyti-
cal rubric has seldom been applied to their case in legal
scholarship.' 22 What are the bargaining power dynamics and what
affects the balance or imbalance of power?
Some literature on private ordering suggests that the value of
reputation-reputational costs and benefits-provides incentives to
contracting parties to treat each other reasonably and in good faith.
For such reputational incentives to work, however, contracting par-
117. For a general discussion of this dynamic, see my analysis in Janet Halley et
al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses: Four Studies in
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 336 (2006).
118. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff. Unilateral Sanctions and
Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437 (Winter 2006).
119. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
120. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settle-
ment and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976).
121. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law
Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994); ROB-
ERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
122. Notable exceptions include Adelle Blackett, Promoting Domestic Workers'
Human Dignity through Specific Regulation, in DOMESTIC WORK AS A FACTOR OF Eu-
ROPEAN IDENTITY: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBALIZATION OF DOMESTIC WORK,
16TH-21ST CENTURIES 211 (Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux ed., 2005); Mundlak &
Shamir, supra note *; Ruthann Robson, A Servant of One's Own: The Continuing
Class Struggle in Feminist Legal Theories, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Justice 392
(2008); Hila Shamir, The State of Care: Rethinking the Distributive Effects of Familial
Care Policies in Liberal Welfare States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 953 (2010).
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ties must be situated in relatively equal and interdependent
bargaining positions. 123
In general, such conditions do not exist here between employers
and employees. The precariousness of the bargaining position of
these workers is in part created by the lack of leverage stemming
from the lack of legal protection in the form of foreground employ-
ment and labor regulations, as well as the insecurity of the right to
work and very presence in the country informed by the background
rules related to migration. As the discussion above demonstrates, one
can identify several places within the legal system where a different
rule choice and/or enforcement practice-e.g., a refusal of exception-
alism for domestic workers in the labor law code; better
implementation of the right to work under international refugee law;
stronger recognition of the human rights of migrant workers-would
shore up the bargaining power of asylum seekers working as domes-
tic laborers in Egypt. Without protection under international or
domestic law, asylum seekers working in Egyptian households are
bargaining not "in the shadow of law" but in its absence. This ab-
sence, however, is highly constructed by the law itself, in the form of
"no-rights"124 rather than rights.
In this legally constructed zone of informality, "private ordering"
is shaped most immediately by background social conditions, which
generally range from indifference to hostility. Social service groups
working with African refugee communities attest to extensive social
marginalization, ranging from social segregation to verbal insults
and physical harassment.1 25 Consequently, these communities in
general are not able to secure educational opportunities or advance-
ment in desirable jobs.
Beyond this social marginalization, the strong police presence of
the authoritarian Egyptian government results in documented mis-
treatment of African migrant communities.1 26 "Round-ups of anyone
who 'looks' African are often reported and unmistakably racially mo-
123. ELLICKSON,supra note 121.
124. Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 28 (1913).
125. EIPR & FIDH, supra note 66, at 6 (observing that "[m]igrant workers, espe-
cially black Africans, report regular verbal harassment and physical attacks both in
the streets by members of the public and by law-enforcement officials in Egypt" and
detailing specific incidents). Social hostility results from both racial, see AHMED &
Dins, supra note 40, at 25 (noting that the literature on Sudanese and other African
refugees in Cairo "describe[s] racism as part of everyday life in Cairo and deem[s]
racist attitudes ... as institutionalized in areas such as healthcare and housing."),
and economic biases, see Nkrumah, supra note 104 (quoting a source as saying, "Un-
employment rates are very high in Egypt, and most Egyptians are poor and do not
want Sudanese competition for limited job opportunities."). Many Egyptians would
also protest that they have demonstrated relative hospitability towards these foreign
and disadvantaged communities.
126. BADAwY, supra note 67, at 4.
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tivated.' 27 The 2005 police killings of Sudanese protesters constitute
a particularly acute expression of this general environment.
Thus, the experience of African migrant workers in Cairo is one
that is shaped, on the one hand, by gaping informality as channeled
through historically and discursively constructed market preferences;
and, on the other hand, by sporadic and hostile encounters with the
state. The impact of exclusion, combined with these dynamics of bar-
gaining, means a great deal of vulnerability. Women migrant
domestic workers are "particularly vulnerable to discrimination, ex-
ploitation and abuse of all kinds, including harassment, violence by
employers and coercion by employment agencies, forced labor, low
wages and inadequate social coverage. 1 28 Labor abuses include not
paying or withholding wages, not paying overtime, requiring long
hours and difficult or heavy work, inadequate rest and leave, sub-
standard living conditions, and lack of remedies for contract breach
or termination. 129 Because of their "isolated circumstances within
private homes," the fact that they are "not protected by national labor
law" and their migrant status, migrant domestic workers, predomi-
nantly women, are "at particular risk of forced labor." 3 0
Within these generally bleak conditions, however, some variabil-
ity does exist in employment relationships, and particular employers
and employees can create their own scenarios that depart from the
norm. 131 In addition, some employers' preferences for particular na-
tionalities (for example, Ethiopians are considered to be desirable
127. See EIPR & FIDH, supra note 66, at 7. This report recounts the 2004 findings
of UN Special Rapporteur on 2004 incident of racially motivated arrests of hundreds
of foreigners that took place in Cairo:
During the raids, which reportedly took place on 28 and 29 January, plain-
clothes policemen and security forces allegedly entered homes, without show-
ing either identification or warrants, and arrested foreigners, predominantly
people of sub-Saharan African origin .... Still others were beaten during the
arrests and sustained injuries as a result. It was reported that police wagons
and minibuses patrolled the streets of the al-Maadi district of Cairo through-
out the day on 28 January, looking for "Blacks." Reportedly, 28 January was
referred to as "Black Day" and the intake sheet on which police took names
at al-Maadi station was reportedly headed, in Arabic, "Operation Track
Down Blacks." Detainees were reportedly held at al-Maadi and Bassatin po-
lice stations in inhumane and crowded conditions.
Id. (citing Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrant workers,
Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, Addendum: Communications sent to Governments and
replies received, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/76/Add.1, para. 60).
128. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, EQUALITY AT WORK: TACKLING THE
CHALLENGES 31 (2007).
129. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SWEPT UNDER THE RUG: ABUSES AGAINST DOMESTIC
WORKERS AROUND THE WORLD (2006).
130. ILO, supra note 128.
131. Interview with Dr. Ray Jureidini, Director of Center for Migration and Refu-
gee Studies (CMRS), American University in Cairo, in Cairo, Egypt (Feb. 10, 2009).
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employees) lend those workers some bargaining power compared to
their counterparts of other nationalities. 132
Finally, some social networks can partially redress this gap by
producing social pressures where there are community linkages
amongst employers and/or employees. For example, where asylum-
seekers are placed by nonprofit groups, such as churches, with em-
ployers there may be a desire to maintain good standing in the eyes of
the organization and any community associated with it. One church
group in Egypt that places asylum seekers as domestic workers also
creates simple, one-page contracts that set forth the agreed wage and
hours. Church workers know that these contracts are completely un-
enforceable, but hope that the formalized act of creating them and
the church "seal of approval" will increase the likelihood that the
terms are followed.
There are limits to this dynamic, and it also can work in the op-
posite direction. In order to maintain placements for asylum seekers,
the church is hesitant to be too demanding against employers. There
is no language on termination in the contract; rather, if the employer
fires someone, the church simply replaces the employee unless there
is clear evidence of employer abuse. 13 3 The foreground rules and
background rules once again affect this situation: there is little nor-
mative pressure that could provide the basis for demanding better
treatment.
III: REFLECTIONS
A. Global Governance in a Context of Inequality and Instability
This specific study of domestic workers' experiences in a politi-
cally complex region of the developing world speaks to the challenge
of a highly specialized international law framework to govern a much
more interpenetrated reality-one of the challenges identified in the
International Law Commission's widely-read report on "fragmenta-
tion."13 4 As a de jure matter, several specialized international treaty
132. Interview with Mekonnen Firew, American University in Cairo, Egypt (Sept.
29, 2008).
133. Interview with All Saints Cathedral, supra note 65.
134. See U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.41L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) ("[S]uch specialized
law-making and institution-building tends to take place with relative ignorance of
legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the general princi-
ples and practices of international law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-
systems, deviating institutional practices and, possibly, loss of an overall perspective
on the law."); U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficul-
ties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 6, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (defining frag-
mentation as "the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-
complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.").
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bodies potentially address the plight of these workers: the UN Refu-
gee Convention and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees; the UN
Migrant Workers' Convention and the UN Rapporteur on Migrant
Workers; and the ILO conventions on migrant workers. De facto, the
reality is that migrants from the Sudan and the Horn of Africa are
often seeking political asylum as well as economic survival, blurring
and further complicating these already legally fragmented categories.
The exclusion of domestic workers from the Egyptian national labor
code is not untypical, and the lacuna created by this exclusion is not
adequately supported by the ambiguous or inadequately imple-
mented treaty provisions on the rights of refugees and/or migrant
workers.
This study also provides occasion to consider the relationship be-
tween migration and sovereignty. Migration is often styled as a
challenge to sovereignty and national identity, and sovereignty is
deemed to include plenary power over immigration and citizenship
rights. Yet modern-day state practices of immigration and border
control are much more recent than either sovereignty or globaliza-
tion. Prior to the late nineteenth century, no immigration law in the
modern sense of the term existed, and migration in earlier waves of
globalization was unchecked by such restrictions. Instead, such mea-
sures result from the bureaucratic capabilities and economic
strategies of modern states. The need for economic expansion and the
accompanying "problem of circulation" 135 led to governmental inno-
vation of population control techniques with modern administrative
technology. 136 Governmental assertion of control over immigration
may now therefore be interdependent with the rise of global liberali-
zation in other sectors of the market. Economic globalization, then,
does not solve the "problem of sovereignty" but rather renders it
"more acute than ever."137
The interdependence of economic globalization and border con-
trol explains why migration flows have not been liberalized to any
degree close to the extent that trade flows have under international
law. Migration could, after all, be viewed as merely a subset of inter-
national trade, denoting flows of labor instead of goods or capital.
Many economists argue that liberalizing migration flows would in-
crease economic benefits and growth for poor countries many times
over conventional trade liberalization. 138 Instead, migration has re-
mained a product largely of national law and policy. In fact, rather
135. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COL-
LIGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978, at 12-13 (Graham Burchell trans., 2007).
136. Id. at 110 ("This state of government, which essentially bears on the popula-
tion and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would
correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security.").
137. Id. at 112.
138. 2008 IOM Report, supra note 22, at 41.
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than undergoing liberalization "[s]ince the early 1990s, prosperous
Western states have been engaged in a worldwide crackdown on ille-
gal migration."139
Particularly in a global context of deep inequality, citizenship in
an affluent society is an extremely valuable asset.140 This affluence
produces both the desirability of migration, for those in less well-off
countries, and the fear that migration will erode it, in the affluent
ones. Consequently, the current form of globalization often tends to
situate the developing world as economically and politically problem-
atic for rich countries. Migration into the developed world from
developing countries has increased markedly over the past thirty
years.1 41 Overall migration levels have remained stable over time, at
about three percent altogether.1 42 However, in past eras migrating
populations originated primarily in Europe1 43 and went to the west-
ern and southern hemispheres. While globalization itself is not
new,14 4 its current form may be more visibly challenging the nation-
states of the global North. Poor countries potentially threaten eco-
nomic security of populations in the global North, either through the
export of trade or the export of people. These influxes jeopardize the
social and economic security that modern welfare states provided to
offset the effects of earlier globalizations. 14 5
This dynamic is by no means exclusive to the global North, as
this Essay indicates. Indeed, in the wake of counterterrorism mea-
sures adopted by the West, a number of states elsewhere, including
Egypt and some of its neighboring countries, 14 6 have made
139. DAUVERGNE, supra note 72, at 14 (2008).
140. AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INE-
QUALITY 5 (2009) ("full membership in an affluent society emerges as a complex form
of property inheritance: a valuable entitlement that is transmitted, by law, to a re-
stricted group of recipients under conditions that perpetuate the transfer of this
precious entitlement .... This inheritance carries with it an immensely valuable
bundle of rights, benefits and opportunities.").
141. 2008 IOM Report, supra note 22, at 33-34.
142. See SHACHAR, supra note 140, at 5.
143. 2008 IOM Report, supra note 22, at 209.
144. Id. at 25 (describing three waves of globalization: (1) between 1870 and
1914-falling tariffs and transport costs allowed for export of intensive commodity
production in "abundant" land [through colonialism] and also for significant emigra-
tion; (2) 1950-1980, manufacture trade liberalization through reduction in tariffs; (3)
current: incorporation of developing countries as nation-states).
145. See Adelle Blackett, Trade Liberalization, Labour Law and Development: A
Contextualization, ILO, Int'l Inst. for Labour Stud., Geneva, Discussion Paper DP/
179/2007 (2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publica-
tions/discussion/dp17907.pdf (discussing Karl Polanyi's view that "social welfare
entitlements for the paradigmatic workers in the North [were given] in exchange for
the progressive liberalization in the economy .... ").
146. See EGYPTIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT
(2009) (discussing the draft Egyptian counterterrorism law). For a discussion of simi-
lar proposed laws in Israel, see Mundlak, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing a new
measure on "infiltration" which would provide "harsh measures for the detention and
return of infiltrators" and establish that "they cannot be regularized."). For a discus-
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counterterrorism the justification for new and harsher laws and prac-
tices controlling migration.147 Such factors shape developing-country
labor markets. While these labor markets are characterized by infor-
mality, workers' experiences are also punctuated by periodic and
brutal encounters with the state in its punitive forms, e.g., in police
round-ups, detentions and deportations. More recently, pressure
from the global North has intervened to stem the tide of migration
into the North from countries like Egypt, with the apparent effect of
ramping up such police actions. Thus, the interaction of informality
with biopolitics appears to form an important instantiation of the
contemporary "developmental state."
B. The Economic Family and Feminist Legal Theory
One assumption of gender mainstreaming discourse is that wo-
men are in positions of greater social vulnerability because of
historical subordination. 148 In the market for domestic labor, how-
ever, historical constructs operate to give women a distinct
socioeconomic advantage. Surveys by NGOs and academic research-
ers have found that migrant women are more able to find jobs
because of the widespread availability of domestic work and the pref-
erence to hire women in that domain. In Cairo, pay for domestic work
also tends to be higher than the jobs available to men from the same
communities, which include serving as office cleaners, errand run-
ners, and trash pickers. 149 Migratory experience can simultaneously
reinforce gender and race norms and inequalities at some levels,
while challenging them at others by allowing women to become eco-
nomic providers for themselves and for their transnational
networks. 150 The relative market advantage of women over men
sion of Libya's sudden and draconian border measures, see Interview with Mohamed
Lotfy, supra note 99.
147. See Human Rights Watch, Israel: Court Should Halt Forced Returns of Mi-
grants to Egypt, Avoid Complicity in Serious Egyptian Violations, Dec. 12, 2009.
148. This assumption about distributive justice is reflected in the "gender main-
streaming" discourse, defined by the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender
Issues and Advancement of Women as "a globally accepted strategy for promoting
gender equality... [which] ensures that gender perspectives and attention to the goal
of gender equality are central to all activities." U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on
Gender Issues and Advancement of Women [OSAGI], Gender Mainstreaming, http:fl
www.un.org/womenwatcldosagi/gendermainstreaming.htm (last visited June 8,
2010).
149. Interview with All Saints Cathedral, supra note 65.
150. Jacqueline Bhabha has pointed out that this double-sidedness extends to legal
recognition:
What the evidence reveals is that while female asylum seekers have a rela-
tive disadvantage in gaining access to developed states, but a relative
advantage in securing asylum once they do gain access and an application is
made, separated children appear, on the evidence available, to be in the op-
posite situation: relatively privileged in securing access, but disadvantaged
in being accorded the security of refugee status.
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amongst African asylum seekers in Cairo may be seen as challenging,
or at least qualifying, any assumption that gender relations always
subordinate the former to the latter.
The significance of this market advantage should not be over-
stated. After all, it stems from employer preferences based on social
profiles that reflect historical subordination. In addition to reinforc-
ing disadvantageous social identity constructs, this market
advantage does not necessarily reflect a great deal of material em-
powerment. The pay is still very low: African asylum-seekers "who
are in Cairo (huge numbers, adverse living conditions, very limited
resources), whose supposedly 'brief stay' in Egypt has taken many
years, can barely manage their basic day-to-day needs."151 Moreover,
the greater earning power of women over men can destabilize com-
munities by reversing traditional hierarchies, a dynamic which,
though certainly welcome from a broad perspective, may jeopardize
survival strategies that depend on cohesiveness. 15 2
At the least, however, feminist legal theory must take on board
much more than it has to date the ramifications of structural differ-
ences among women on the basis of class, national origin,
immigration status-and relationship to household labor. "Paid do-
mestic labor poses real challenges on both a philosophical and a
practical level to feminism."1 53 In most cases, domestic workers are
now hired by middle-class and elite women who are the wives and
mothers of their household. Working women who hire other women
do so to enable their own shift out of the household and into the
market.
In the traditional patriarchal household, at least in the Western
configuration of it, domestic laborers were required to create the ba-
sis for survival necessary to support the patriarch in political
citizenship. A person toiling in the household could not be capable of
full citizenship, because he or she was too tied to bare survival. 154
Has the desire of middle- and upper-class women to eschew this zone
of bare survival, of what Arendt called "animal labor," and to bid for
full social citizenship, simply transferred that burden which is not
only actual but also symbolic to the women that they employ? If so,
Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 227, 238 (2004).
151. Assal, supra note 40, at 7.
152. Interview with Mulki Sharmani, Social Science Research Center, American
University in Cairo (Feb. 10, 2009).
153. ANDERSON, supra note 16, at 1.
154. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 45 (2d ed. 1998) ("The private realm
of the household was the sphere where the necessities of life, of individual survival as
well as of continuity of the species, were taken care of and guaranteed .... [Mian
existed in this sphere not as a truly human being but only as a specimen of the animal
species man-kind.").
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women employers of domestic women workers may have taken on
some aspects of the traditional patriarchal role. 15
5
There are sharp implications here for gender policy and analysis.
Whereas much feminist theory on the family focuses on the house-
hold wife/ mother, this social frame should be expanded to include the
possible presence of women domestic workers. Within this frame, we
should focus on the possible tensions between, and opposing interests
of, women domestic migrant workers and women who are their em-
ployers. Indeed, women domestic workers are often wives and
mothers themselves, who must find means of providing care work for
their own households in their absence.
What results is a transnational and global "care chain," in which
women with diverse social and legal status encounter each other
through the negotiation of care work and other household labor. This
diversity challenges some feminist constructs that have assumed a
"homogeneity of oppression."156 Rather, the position of domestic
workers is strongly affected by the legacy of particularized oppres-
sions through colonialism and slavery, meaning that the relationship
between women domestic workers and the women they work for may
reproduce and reinforce some aspects of broader social hierarchies.
155. In an extensive study of domestic workers in Cairo households, sociologist Ray
Jureidini reported that "[clonsistent with other studies around the world, most [non-
sexual abuse such as] yelling, name-calling and hitting was perpetrated by the 'mad-
ame' of the household." Jureidini, supra note 46, at 87.
156. ANDERSON, supra note 16, at 5.
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